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Many of the various forms of cooperative strategy that firms are pursuing in today’s 
economy entail the placing of important business functions in the hands of a partner.  This 
paper examines the role of trust in the decision by a producer to place the marketing 
function in the hands of another entity, namely a cooperative.  Although others have studied 
the effect of what may be termed general trust on inter-organizational relationships, few 
have examined the antecedents of that trust.  We propose a model in which affective 
responses and cognitive processes are precursors to a sense of general trust, which, in turn, 
influences the outsourcing decision.  These affective responses and cognitive processes have 
both direct and indirect (mediated) effects on the decision to place an important function in 
the hands of another entity.  Perceptions of partner expertise in the business function at 
hand and the perceived need for the focal firm to maintain control over that function are 
also considered in the model.  The model is tested in a somewhat novel context: the decision 
of cotton producers to outsource the marketing of their cotton fiber.  Using survey data 
gathered from the actual decision-maker, and structural equations modeling, we find that 
the inclusion of affective responses and cognitive processes in our model produces a richer 
explanation of the outsourcing decision.  The differences between the effects of affective 
responses and cognitive processes have potentially important implications for managers 





                                                           
L  Corresponding author: Tel: + 1-801-422-4362 
       Fax:  + 1-801-422-0539 
             Email: mh_hansen@byu.edu 
Other contact information: J.L. Morrow, Jr. Phone: (205) 226-4827, Fax: (205) 226-3080, 
       bmorrow@bsc.edu M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
  41
Strategic alliances appear to be an increasingly important business model for 
conducting economic exchange.  The strategic alliance form of organization is widely 
used throughout the food and agribusiness industry.  The agricultural marketing 
cooperative may be viewed as one of the oldest, most well established forms of 
strategic alliance (Staatz, 1983; Vitaliano, 1983).  Grocery retailers also use the 
cooperative form of organization to gain purchasing and distribution efficiencies. 
(Progressive Grocer, 2000).    
 
One important source of economic benefit to be gained from the strategic alliance 
model is outsourcing (Murray & Kotabe, 1999; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994;  
Venkatraman, 1997).  Outsourcing through a strategic alliance typically involves the 
placing of a business function in the hands of a partner.  Agricultural marketing 
cooperatives have been facilitating the transfer of the marketing function from the 
producer to the management of the cooperative, in varying degrees, for decades.  
More recently, a similar transfer has been observed in many other industries.  For 
example, e-businesses often enter into alliances with logistics and shipping firms.  In 
these alliances, the e-business places all the necessary logistics and shipping 
functions in the hands of their partners.  The economic benefit of these alliances 
stems primarily from efficiency advantages of specialization.  These advantages are 
revealed not only in the lowered costs of logistics and shipping but also in the 
increased ability of the e-business to focus on core competencies such as product 
development, marketing, financing, etc.  Similarly, agricultural marketing 
cooperatives have allowed producers to focus their efforts on production. 
 
Entering into a strategic alliance is a significant decision for a firm.  Scholars have 
argued that trust plays an important role in the adoption and management of the 
strategic alliance model (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer, 1996, 1997; Gulati, 1995; 
Sako, 1992).  Placing a business function, especially a critical one, in the hands of a 
partner is also a significant decision.  In fact, some have argued that this decision 
may be a critical determinant in economic performance (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994;  
Venkatraman, 1997).  It stands to reason that if trust were important in the initial 
decision to enter an alliance, it would also play a role in subsequent outsourcing 
decisions.  The purpose of this paper is to develop and test arguments as to what the 
role of trust is in outsourcing decisions.  Specifically, we examine the affective 
responses and cognitive processes that lead to a sense of general trust.  We also 
examine how the relationship between trust and outsourcing is mediated by 
perceptions of competency and the need to maintain control over a business function. 
 
The research on trust in organizations, including strategic alliances, may be divided 
into two broad categories:  1) the development of trust, and 2) the effect of trust.  
This paper is an attempt to link these two broad categories.  Several models of the 
development of trust have been offered by scholars: repeated ties (Gulati, 1995), 
affect- and cognition-based trust (McAllister, 1995, high initial trust (cognition) 
(McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998); conditional, unconditional, distrust 
(Jones & George, 1998), exchange framework (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & 
Werner, 1998), weak-, semi-strong-, and strong form (Barney & Hansen, 1994).  The 
definitions offered in the development of trust literature are usually specific to the M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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model being developed.  However, a common thread running through each one of 
these models, to varying degrees, is that of trust resulting from affective responses 
and cognitive processes. 
 
Whereas the definitions in the trust development literature tend to be relatively 
specific, the definition of trust used in much of the effect of trust literature is more 
general.  For example, Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, & Martin (1997) use a working 
definition of trust offered by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995: 712):  “The 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party.”  Brockner, et al., 
(1997) did elaborate on this definition so as to include the elements of risk, 
competency, and motivation.  In the end, however, the notion of trust is very general 
in nature.  For example in casual conversation, if a person is asked whether or not 
another individual can be trusted, the person asking and the person responding both 
understand what is meant by ‘trust’.  In fact, Brockner, et al., (1997: 563) measured 
trust by asking simple, straightforward questions such as “I trust the management 
to treat me fairly.”  We refer to such trust as general trust.  
 
Regardless of whether the definition of trust used is general or specific, the notion of 
an expectation about the behavior of another party seems to be a constant in the 
effect of trust literature (e.g., Barney & Hansen, 1994; Brockner, et al., 1997; Dyer, 
1997; Sako, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).  Much of this research has 
focused on the cost savings associated with trusting relationships (Dyer, 1996,1997; 
Parkhe, 1993, Sako, 1992).  As such, trust is generally viewed as an important 
element in minimizing transaction costs.  However, some have also argued that 
trust may be an important element in expanding the set of potential revenue 
opportunities associated with alliances (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Hansen, Hoskisson, & Barney, 1999).  Outsourcing is one of the vehicles by 
which alliances may offer the dual benefits of cost reduction and revenue 
enhancement.  We argue that general trust is an important element in the decision 
to outsource.  However, we also argue that there are significant antecedents to 
general trust that must be considered in any robust explanation of the role of trust 
in the outsourcing decision. 
 
Nature of Outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing is largely a matter of degree for most organizations.  For example, a 
firm could outsource its janitorial function and, it could also outsource key elements 
of its R&D function.  Both would be outsourcing, and yet, the strategic relevance of 
the two decisions would likely range from trivial to critical, respectively.  Certainly a 
company faces less risk in outsourcing janitorial services than it does in outsourcing 
an R&D function.  Thus, the significance of the decision to outsource varies 
depending on what is being outsourced.  This is not to say that decisions such as the 
janitorial outsourcing decision are not important, as such a decision may present 
significant cost savings opportunities.  Although trust is likely a factor in both M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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strategically relevant and strategically irrelevant decisions, the focus in this paper is 
on outsourcing decisions that are strategically relevant. 
 
Researchers have concluded that outsourcing definitely has its upside and its 
downside.  Quinn (2000) argues that outsourcing is a strategic necessity in today’s 
innovation-dependent economy.  He argues that no single firm can innovate as 
efficiently or as effectively alone as it could with the collaboration of other firms 
through outsourcing.  Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel (1992), on the other hand, warn 
that outsourcing may also lead to industrial decline if done without the proper care.  
They point out that firms stand to lose important competencies over time that may 
be critical to strategic competitiveness.  Once a firm has lost these competencies, the 
firm may be unable to regain these competencies to a degree that would confer 
competitive advantage.  There is broad agreement in the literature that outsourcing 
done correctly has the potential to enhance a firm’s competitive position, but that 
outsourcing done incorrectly will almost certainly be detrimental (Bettis, et al., 
1992; Murray & Kotabe, 1999; Quinn, 2000; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
 
A key element in an outsourcing strategy is deciding which activities to outsource.  
Indeed the main problem with outsourcing noted by Bettis, et al., (1992) was that 
firms too often choose to outsource activities that are key to competitiveness.  Quinn 
and Hilmer (1994: 43) suggest that firms follow a dual approach to outsourcing: 1) 
concentrate on core competencies and achieve definable preeminence, and 2) 
strategically outsource other activities for which the firms have neither a critical 
need nor special capability.  This logic suggests that firms must understand the 
relevant marketplace and firm-specific capabilities in order to determine which firm 
competencies are or may become preeminent.  Firms must then exercise discipline in 
deciding which activities to outsource and which activities to nurture and protect.  
Further discipline is required as firms choose suppliers to whom activities are to be 
outsourced. 
 
Given the potential benefits and pitfalls of outsourcing, the decision to outsource is 
one that deserves careful consideration.  The decision is made even more salient by 
the fact that most supplier markets are imperfect (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994).  This 
imperfection arises, in part, from the uncertainty associated with turning over an 
important business function to another entity.  Assessments of the trustworthiness 
of the managers of the other entity play a crucial role in attenuating these 
uncertainty concerns.  Trust helps facilitate exchanges in uncertain circumstances 
because of the expectation that supplier-firms will not exploit vulnerabilities.  While 
we recognize that trust alone is not a sufficient condition, we argue that it is 
certainly a necessary condition of the outsourcing decision.  As such, the 
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The Development of General Trust 
 
While many scholars may agree on a fundamental definition of trust and the 
conditions necessary for trust to arise, a variety of conceptualizations of trust have 
been offered, particularly in terms of the nature of trust and its dimensionality. For 
example, among the different forms of trust suggested by Rousseau et. al. (1998) are 
deterrence-based trust, calculus-based trust, and relational trust. Sako (1992) 
categorized trust as being of three basic types: contractual, competence, and 
goodwill. Other conceptualizations view trust as having conditional and 
unconditional states (Jones & George, 1998) or weak, strong and semi-strong forms 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994). Several scholars have conceptualized trust as having 
cognitive and affective dimensions (e.g., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Empirically, 
McAllister (1995) found that interpersonal trust among members in an organization 
was both affect-based and cognition-based.  
 
The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Trust 
 
What are the antecedents of general trust? While Jones and George (1998) 
conceptualized trust as consisting of three states: conditional, unconditional, and 
distrust, they described both cognitive processes and affective influences in arriving 
at the different states of trust.  Thus, trust develops from a process, or pattern, of 
thinking and feeling on the part of the trustor regarding the potential object of trust. 
Others have described this process and the resulting cognitive and affective trust 
(Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Zaheer, 
McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). 
 
Cognitive processes.  McAllister (1995) argued that interpersonal trust is cognition-
based because individuals choose who they will trust and base this decision on what 
they believe are “good reasons” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).  The choice to trust and the 
search for “good reasons” suggest a cognitive process by which one determines that 
an individual, group or organization is trustworthy. Therefore, a key to 
understanding general trust is the recognition of the process by which individuals 
arrive at some assessment of the trustworthiness of another individual, group, or 
organization. In other words, cognitive processes are descriptive of how one develops 
“good reasons” that others are trustworthy.  Thus, we define cognitive processes as a 
series of careful, methodical thought routines that culminates in a general belief 
that an individual, group or organization is trustworthy. This careful, methodical 
process involves the consideration of “empirical evidence” (Jones & George, 1998).  
That portion of general trust resulting from cognitive processes is therefore not an 
instantaneous phenomena, it develops only after an individual is able to cognitively 
process and assess the available evidence. 
 
The cognitive process base of general trust seems consistent with what Jones and 
George (1998) termed unconditional trust.  Their unconditional trust state is 
reached only after an individual is able to develop confidence in others that is 
“backed up by empirical evidence” (1998: 537). Jones and George also argued that M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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trust is based on attitudes, which can be viewed as “(1) the knowledge structures 
containing the specific thoughts and feelings people have about other people, groups, 
or organizations and (2) the means [process] through which they define and 
structure their interactions with others” (1998: 532).  Thus, attitudes, which 
partially determine trust, may be developed as individuals engage in a cognitive 
process to assess the trustworthiness of others. 
 
Calculus-based trust as described by Rousseau, et al., (1998) is also consistent with 
a cognitive process base of general trust. They argued that calculus-based trust is 
the result of a rational choice that is made based on “credible information” 
concerning the intentions or competence of others. Thus, a rational, cognitive-based 
process is needed for individuals to gain “proof sources” that provide this credible 
evidence concerning the trustworthiness of others (Rousseau et. al., 1998).  
 
Finally, a cognitive-based process is also crucial to Barney and Hansen’s (1994) 
typology of semi-strong and strong form trustworthiness. In both of these forms of 
trustworthiness, one party assesses the trustworthiness of another party. The party 
weighs the evidence embedded in both the attributes of the transaction and the 
characteristics of the other party(s) to the transaction. In the case of semi-strong 
form trustworthiness, the cognitive process results in the determination that the 
costs of opportunistic behavior by a partner would outweigh the benefit of such 
behavior to the other partner, and, therefore, the other party may be trusted. Strong 
form trustworthiness suggests that a party to a transaction has come to the 
conclusion, after weighing the evidence of partner characteristics, that the other 
partner’s own moral development would likely prevent such opportunistic behavior. 
 
A sense of general trust develops as managers engage in the cognitive process of 
evaluating the available information about the trustworthiness of the managers of 
supplier-firms.  While it is certainly the case that in some instances such cognitive 
processes result in lower general trust or perhaps even distrust, we argue that 
increasing levels of cognitive processes will result in increasing levels of general 
trust.  Thus, 
  
 H1: Cognitive processes will have a positive effect on the general trust that 
managers have for the managers of supplier-firms. 
  
Affective responses. Lewis and Weigert (1985) argued that trust also consists of an 
emotional base that is distinct from, but complementary to, its cognitive base. Thus, 
we define affective responses as the response an individual experiences based on 
one’s instincts, intuitions or feelings that culminate in a general belief that an 
individual, group or organization is trustworthy. While cognitive processes refer to 
how one develops “good reasons” that others may be trusted, affective responses 
refer to the “emotional bonds” that may result in trust between parties.  Affective 
responses may lead to general trust because these emotional bonds may eventually 
provide the basis for trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995).  Jones and 
George explained that the development of trust begins with one party “suspend[ing] 
belief that the other party may not be trustworthy” (1998: 536). This suspension M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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takes place because of the initial absence of evidence to cognitively evaluate. We 
argue that during this suspension the parties to an exchange are relying on affective 
responses (e.g., instincts, intuitions, and feelings) to arrive at some determination of 
the trustworthiness of the other party(s). Affective responses in the very early stages 
of an exchange relationship may be likened to a “gut” or “knee-jerk” reaction based 
on the intuitive feelings generated by the experience with the other party. As the 
relationship progresses, these initial instincts, intuitions and feelings influence the 
cognitive processes by which perceptions of trustworthiness continue to develop. The 
affective states experienced during interactions with others influence the level or 
state of trust held among parties (Jones & George, 1998).   
 
While Jones and George argued that moods and emotions impact all types of trust, 
we suggest that the notion of affective responses is consistent with their conditional 
trust construct. They defined conditional trust as a state in which the attitudes of 
parties toward each other are favorable, thus they are willing to continue future 
interactions, as long as both parties exhibit appropriate behavior. Jones and George 
note that “sufficient positive affect and a relative lack of negative affect” act to 
reinforce the attitudes that lead to conditional trust (1998: 536). This suggests that 
conditional trust has a strong affect-based component. 
 
Affective responses are also conceptually similar to what Rousseau and her 
colleagues (1998) termed relational trust.  Indeed, they acknowledged that because 
relational trust has a large emotional component, scholars often refer to this form of 
trust as affective trust. An element of affective trust is also present in Barney and 
Hansen’s (1994) typology of trustworthiness. The affective states experienced in 
dealing with a partner would certainly influence perceptions about the 
trustworthiness of that partner. Positive affect would serve to bolster perceptions 
that another partner possessed the type of character that would prevent 
opportunistic behavior (strong form trustworthiness). Negative affect, on the other 
hand, would likely cause partners to insist on contractual safeguards (semi-strong 
form trustworthiness). 
 
General trust may vary in the degree to which it is based on cognitive processes and 
affective responses. As suggested above, the balance between these two antecedents 
of general trust may shift depending on the experiences of the partners. For 
example, the trust that one has for a fellow airline passenger who is a complete 
stranger is largely a matter of affective response to initial appearances and 
impressions.  However, as one visits with the fellow airline passenger and learns of 
accomplishments and experiences cognitive processes begin to influence the sense of 
trust felt.  Likewise, the general trust that one has for colleagues at work may be 
affect-based because these individuals seem like “nice” people and everyone “gets 
along.” However, if one is considering pursuing a business venture with colleagues 
from work where the potential for opportunistic behavior is high, then the general 
trust that one has for colleagues is likely to be more informed by cognitive processes.  
     
The intensity of the affective response experienced by a person is dependent upon 
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attitudes, likes and dislikes that have developed over time, and memories of past 
experiences strongly influence the affective response a person will have to any given 
situation.  These factors lead to a reaction with little or no cognitive effort or process.  
External factors such as the appearance, language, and mannerisms of the party 
with whom the focal person is interacting also influence the affective response.  The 
setting of the interaction may also influence the affective response of a person.  
Lighting, sound, and smell can play a role in determining the intensity of affective 
response.  Managers who have a more intense affective response are more likely to 
develop higher levels of general trust.  Of course, the affective response managers 
experience may also be negative, in which case low levels of general trust would 
likely result.  However, we argue that overall, managers experiencing more intense 
affective responses will develop higher levels of general trust.  Thus, we propose,  
  
 H2: The affective response of managers will have a positive effect on the general 
trust felt for the mangers of supplier-firms. 
 
The Effect of General Trust on Outsourcing 
  
The primary effect of general trust on the outsourcing decision lies in the 
expectation that supplier-firm managers can and will perform the business function 
in question in a manner consistent with the interests of the focal firm.  The role of 
trust in facilitating economic exchange is well documented (Barney & Hansen, 1994; 
Rousseau et. al., 1998; Williamson, 1993).  A sense of trust for another economic 
actor reduces the inherent uncertainty surrounding any transaction. 
 
General trust as defined here, and trust as used in common language, entails an 
expectation as to both the competence and the character of another economic actor.  
If one were to lack confidence in the competence of another, one would probably have 
a low level of general trust, even though one might have confidence in the character 
of the other person.  Thus, if a person holds a high level of general trust for another 
person  it is assumed that the person has confidence in the other person’s 
competence and character.  This confidence therefore reduces both ability-to-perform 
uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty (Williamson, 1993). 
 
The uncertainty reducing nature of general trust leads managers to favor supplier-
firm managers who are judged to be trustworthy.  Again, we do not argue that trust 
is the only factor influencing the outsourcing decision.  Rather, we argue that 
general trust matters in the decision and that managers will tend to choose supplier 
firms whose management is trusted.  Thus, 
 
H3:  General trust will be positively associated with the decision 
to outsource. 
 
Expertise and The Need for Control 
 
In addition to the influence of general trust, two other important factors influence 
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the need for control on the part of the focal firm.  As managers decide which 
activities to outsource these two factors create a tension.  Managers may recognize 
that a supplier firm has more expertise in a certain business function than the focal 
firm.  On the other hand, the managers may feel compelled to maintain control of 
that particular business function.  The resolution of this tension may largely 
determine the success or failure of not only the outsourcing strategy but of the firm 
(Bettis, et al., 1992). 
 
Central to the outsourcing decision is the issue of whether or not an outside supplier 
can perform an activity better than the focal firm can.  Indeed, Quinn and Hilmer 
(1994) would argue that identifying the best-in-world supplier of an activity, be it 
internal or external, is the first step in a successful outsourcing strategy.  The 
routines used in making this important first-step decision likely vary from firm to 
firm.  These routines may range from casual observation to intense study and 
research.  Regardless of how the conclusion is reached, the perception that an 
outside supplier possesses more expertise than the focal firm in a particular 
business function bears a strong influence on the outsourcing decision.  Managers 
who arrive at this conclusion would likely opt to outsource in the absence of any 
tension due to the need to control a function.   
 
As managers develop perceptions of supplier-firm expertise, cognitive processes and 
affective responses shape those perceptions.  These cognitive processes and affective 
responses are likely very similar to those involved in developing general trust.  We 
propose that general trust for managers of a potential outside supplier influences 
perceptions of expertise.  In other words, managers of the focal firm develop some 
level of general trust for managers of a potential outside supplier that, in turn, 
affects the perception of the expertise of those outside suppliers. 
General trust felt for managers of outside suppliers will have a positive effect on the 
development of perceptions of expertise.  Thus, we propose: 
 
H4:  General trust is positively associated with perceptions of supplier-
firm expertise. 
 
Obviously, managers who are convinced that supplier firms possess superior 
expertise would be inclined to choose an outsourcing strategy.   However, the 
influence of general trust and the tension created by the need to maintain control of 
a business function may make the correct outsourcing decision less obvious.  Owens 
Corning recently outsourced its expense management function to VIN.net on an ASP 
basis (Kearney, 2000).  An important consideration for Owens Corning was the 
potential loss of control.  Owens Corning determined that any loss of control in 
outsourcing was more than offset by the cost savings provided by VIN.net’s system.  
We suspect that for every outsourcing decision that gets written-up in a trade 
journal like Owens Corning’s did, there are many more decisions not to outsource 
that never become publicly known. The proportion of these decisions not to 
outsource that result from a need to control concern outweighing the benefit of 
supplier-firm expertise remains an empirical question beyond the scope of this 
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outsourcing because the expected costs of loss of control exceed the expected benefits 
of putting a business function into the hands of an outside supplier.   
 
The expertise-control tension begs an intriguing question:  Does control of a second-
rate business function ever trump having that business function in the hands of the 
best-in-world supplier?  The arguments of Bettis, et al., (1992) would suggest that 
firms should avoid losing competencies even if other suppliers may have an 
advantage.  Quinn and Hilmer (1994) and Quinn (2000) suggest that firms should 
strive to be best-in-world in their own core competencies and outsource other 
activities to best-in-world suppliers.  It is important to note that in the eight years 
between Bettis, et al., (1992) and Quinn (2000) rapid innovation has become 
increasingly relevant to strategic success.  Therefore, it would appear that having 
business functions in the hands of best-in-world suppliers would generally offset any 
loss of control disadvantages in today’s innovation-intensive environment.    Thus, 
we argue that: 
 
H5:  Perceptions of supplier-firm expertise in a business function will 
have a stronger influence on the outsourcing decision than the focal 
firm’s need for control. 
 
The outsourcing decision model developed here is depicted in Figure 1.  This paper 
focuses primarily on the antecedents of general trust and its effect on the 
outsourcing decision.  Certainly there are other important relationship possibilities 
and influences on the decision to outsource.  For example, the effects of cognitive 
processes and affective responses on perceptions of supplier-firm expertise are 
especially interesting.  However, by linking the development of trust with the effect 






































We have chosen a somewhat novel context in which to study the outsourcing 
phenomena. The business function of interest is the marketing function of cotton 
producers.  The data for this study were gathered through a survey of the 
membership of a cotton-fiber marketing cooperative located in the Southeastern 
United States.  This cooperative is the largest of its type in the world.  The novelty of 
this context lies in the fact that member producers are not obligated to market their 
cotton through the cooperative, even if such members use the other services of the 
cooperative. 
 
Harvested cotton is first sent to a ginning operation to separate the seed from the 
fiber.  Cotton seed is often taken by the ginning operation as payment for the 
ginning service.  Cotton fiber is then graded, baled, and stored in a storage facility.  
The ginning operation and storage facility may or may not be owned by the 
cooperative.  In some areas there may be only one ginning operation—sometimes 
owned by the cooperative, sometimes owned by some other entity.  Even though all 
cotton fiber must pass through these processes of ginning, baling, and grading, 
choices about the marketing of the cotton fiber may be completely independent of 
these processes.  Thus, a cooperative member may use the ginning and/or storage 
services of the cooperative, but choose not to use the marketing services of the 
cooperative. 
 
Producer-members of the cooperative must choose each year to either market their 
cotton on their own or to market through one of two programs offered by the 
cooperative.  In the cooperative’s Seasonal Program the farmer effectively outsources 
the marketing function by turning all the marketing over to the management of the 
cooperative.  The cooperative markets cotton fiber throughout the year at its 
discretion and farmers receive a price based on the average price obtained by the 
cooperative.   In the Call Program, the farmer retains some control of the marketing 
by determining a price at which the cotton is to be sold.  If and when the market 
reaches that price, the cooperative sells the cotton to a buyer of its choosing and the 
farmer receives that price (adjusted for the appropriate marketing fees).  
 
The agricultural cooperative context is especially salient because the marketing of a 
crop is definitely a core or critical activity (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Venkatraman, 
1997) to a farmer. This context allows data collection from the key decision-maker.  
Indeed, for a farmer whose harvested crop may be worth several million dollars, 
placing the marketing of the crop in the hands of someone else is a profoundly 
significant decision.  Thus, we examine outsourcing in a setting in which the stakes 
are extremely high for managers (farmers).  The context also allows outsourcing to M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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be measured on a continuous scale because farmers can choose to split the 
marketing of their output among three very different marketing approaches. 
 
Furthermore, we find this agricultural setting particularly interesting because these 
marketing arrangements have arisen in response to a nearly perfectly competitive 
market.  As more and more markets are driven closer to perfect competition because 
of technology (e.g., e-commerce) it may well be that traditional, low tech industries 
can offer new, fast-paced, high-tech industries workable business models.  
Specifically, this agricultural setting helps to illustrate the benefits, and perhaps the 
necessity, of extremely high levels of cooperation in the face of highly competitive 
markets. 
 
Survey Instrument Development 
 
We developed the survey instrument following guidelines outlined by Dillman (1978) 
and Tull and Albaum (1973).  A combination of original questions and modified 
scales developed by others was used.  Some questions were intended to gather 
objective information.  Other questions were developed with the intent of tapping 
into abstract constructs.  Rather than simply asking, “Do you trust the managers,” 
we asked several questions regarding how respondents went about determining if 
and how the managers of the cooperative were to be trusted.  We modified a scale 
developed by Rosseau (1988) to assess the level of trust producers had for the 
managers of the cooperative. 
 
After developing the questions through a process of suggestion and review by the co-
authors, a pilot survey was administered to an agricultural marketing cooperative 
separate from the cotton coopertive surveyed for the present study.  Cronbach’s 
alpha statistics were used to assess the degree to which our questions were reliably 
measuring the intended constructs.  Some questions were dropped and others 
changed as a result of the pilot study.  The resulting final survey instrument was 
then administered to members of the cotton cooperative. 
 
The survey is divided into nine sections, with each section intended to gather a 
specific type of information.  The entire survey is included as Appendix 1, although 
not all data collected was used in this study.  Data gathered in sections 1 and 9 are 
descriptive in nature.  Data gathered in sections 2-8 are scale data.  In these 
sections, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or 
disagreement with various statements using either a 5- or 7-point scale.  These data 




A survey questionnaire was mailed to 2,819 members of a farmer-owned marketing 
cooperative headquartered in the southeastern United States. A farmer-owned 
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agree to pool their resources (in this case, crops that have been produced) in the 
alliance (cooperative). Managers of the co-op then seek to sell crops from the pool 
throughout the year at prices that maximize returns to the members.  In essence, 
members must trust that management can achieve a higher average price for the 
pooled crops than an individual farmer could achieve acting on his/her own.  Thus, 
there is an opportunity for trust to develop because of potential fluctuations in crop 
prices (risk) and the interdependence that exists between the farmers and the co-op 
managers (Rousseau et al., 1998).   
 
A letter from the President and CEO of the cooperative endorsing the survey and 
encouraging the members to respond was included with the survey.  Members were 
also informed that respondents would be entered in a drawing for a free weekend in 
a popular Southern city.  The drawing was chosen as an incentive in place of more 
traditional follow-up letters and reminders.    708 individuals completed and 
returned the survey for a response rate of 25.1%.  Missing data reduced the usable 
responses to 690.  The respondents were virtually all white males who farmed an 
average of 2,042 acres (ranging from 20 to 25,000 acres).  The respondents had been 
members of the cooperative for an average of 11.25 years (ranging from 1 to 57 
years).  The only non-response bias testing available to us was a geographic test 
based on zip codes because we did not have any economic performance or size data 
from non-respondents. A t-test analysis indicated there was no significant 




Structural equations modeling (SEM) is a comprehensive modeling technique 
(Hoyle, 1995).  The nuts and bolts of the SEM method is covariance matrix analysis.  
A model is carefully specified which implies a covariance matrix for each 
relationship in the model.  The implied covariance matrix for each relationship is 
compared to the covariance matrices resulting from the observed data.  The 
differences between the implied and observed covariance matrices produce residual 
covariance matrices.  An iterative process is used until values in the residual 
covariance matrices are minimized.  The closer the values in the residual covariance 
matrices are to zero the closer the specified model is to perfectly fitting the observed 
data.   
 
The general SEM consists of a measurement model and a structural model.  In the 
measurement model latent variables are established.  These are variables that are 
not directly observed, but that are indicated by variables that are measured.  In the 
structural portion of the model, relationships are specified among latent variables 
and those measured variables which are not used as indicators of latent variables.  
This methodology may be viewed as more comprehensive than other methodologies 
in that the measurement portion of the model is akin to confirmatory factor analysis 
and the structural portion of the model is akin to regression analysis. The combined 
general SEM model allows an examination of relationships among variables that is 
free of measurement error (Hoyle, 1995). 
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SEM is an appropriate methodology for analyzing the data in this study because it 
allows for the simultaneous estimation of the proposed relationships in Hypotheses 
1-5 (Bollen, 1989).  The examination of relationships between abstract concepts such 
as general trust and perceptions of expertise is made possible through one of the key 
features of SEM: the use of latent variables and measured variables (MacCallum, 
1995).  For example, we used the scales described below to obtain measured 
variables, which were then used to develop the latent variable general trust.  The 
relationships described in Hypotheses 1-5 are represented in the structural model 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
The treatment of the latent variables Expertise and Control in the model depicted in 
Figure 1 are indicative of another compelling feature of SEM.  Expertise is treated 
as an endogenous variable and Control is treated as an exogenous variable.  As we 
specified the model we reasoned that a producer’s perceptions of the marketing 
expertise of the cooperative’s managers would likely be influenced by the general 
trust the producer had for management.  Expertise is an endogenous variable 
because it is partially determined by some other element within the model, namely, 
general trust.  The latent, endogenous variable ‘Expertise’ is thus determined by the 
measured variables from the survey (not depicted in Figure 1) and general trust.  
Control on the other hand, is not partially determined by any other element in the 
model, rather it is determined by the measured variables from the survey.  Our 
theoretical reasoning was that the need for control was independent of the general 
trust the producer had for management.  
 
The ability to include endogenous variables in the model as described above allows 
the testing of mediating relationships (Hoyle, 1995).  Mediating relationships can be 
tested by comparing two models that are specified a priori: one with the mediating 
relationship and one without the mediating relationship in the model.  A change in 
chi-square test and changes in other goodness of fit indices are then used to 
determine which model better fits the data (Hu & Bentler, 1995).  This process of 
comparing alternative models is a very different process from modifying a model 
once results are obtained.  Modifying a model after results are obtained in order to 
achieve a better fitting model subjects any further results to sample specific biases.  
Indeed, one of the criticisms of SEM has been that researchers can so easily modify 
models on a post hoc basis.  
 
Figure 1 is the structural portion of the general model.  The results of the 
measurement portion of the general model are reported below in detail for the 
affective response and cognitive process variables.  The indices of fit for the other 
variables in the measurement portion of the model are not reported in detail (they 
were all likewise indicative of a good fitting model).  The results of the structural 
portion of the general model are reported in Figure 2.  This path diagram approach 
is a common expression of SEM results.  The values on the path diagram are used in 
concluding whether or not the hypotheses are supported by the data (Hoyle, 1995).  
 
 




























SEM is similar to other statistical approaches, such as correlation, regression, and 
ANOVA, in that all are based on linear methods, they all depend on normality 
assumptions, and none of them can test for causality.  The important differences 
between SEM and other models include the SEM requirement of careful model 
specification.  For example, researchers are forced to develop a model of 
relationships rather than relying on a series of straightforward regression tests.  
Also, SEM allows the testing of relationships among latent variables where other 
methods do not.  Another key difference is the ability to test for goodness of fit.  SEM 
models should be tested for goodness of fit using several different approaches as 




Our model of trust was examined using AMOS 4.0, a structural equations modeling 
program (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999).  The maximum likelihood fitting function was 
used to estimate the measurement and structural models.  Bollen (1989) 
recommends using a variety of goodness-of-fit indices to assess the fit between the 
actual data and that predicted from the proposed model.  These indices are 
categorized as measures of absolute fit (GFI), measures of incremental fit (NFI), and 
measures of parsimonious fit (AGFI) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992).  


















p<  .001 = *** 
p< .01 = ** 








Our approach to measuring affective responses and cognitive processes is somewhat 
different from other operationalizations of affective and cognitive trust (Cummings 
& Bromiley, 1996; McAllister, 1995).  Whereas other operationalizations of affective 
and cognitive trust have been intended to assess levels of these trust constructs, our 
operationalizations are intended to help us understand how subjects get to some 
level of general trust. 
 
Cognitive process. The cognitive process was measured by the following items: I 
considered objective criteria when assessing the trustworthiness of management; I 
assessed the trustworthiness of management in an orderly fashion; I relied on a 
rational process to gauge whether management could be trusted; and I used a 
business-like approach to determine if I could trust management.  
 
Affective reaction. Affective reactions were measured by the following items: My 
sense of intuition tells me that management can be trusted; I have a hunch that I 
can trust management; My instincts tell me I can trust management; and I have a 
“gut feeling” that management is trustworthy.  Respondents scored each of the 
cognitive and affective items using a seven-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree).   
 
The measurement portion of the general model was used to assess the construct 
validity of the cognitive and affective measures. The four-item cognitive process 
measure yielded adequate fit (chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom = 18.93, p = 0.0; 
GFI = .99; AGFI = .93).  Likewise, the affective measure also yielded adequate fit 
(chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom = 28.68, p = 0.0; GFI = .98; AGFI = .90).  
Reliability of the measures was tested using Cronbach’s alpha.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the cognitive measure was .86, while the Cronbach’s alpha for the affective 
measure was .91. 
 
General trust. General trust was measured using 4 items that were adapted from a 
scale developed by Rousseau (1988). This scale was also used to measure trust in a 
study by Brockner, et al. (1997). In their study, Brockner and his colleagues asked 
respondents to differentiate between pairs of words that “best described your 
employer’s relationship with you in general” (emphasis added). Respondents used 
five-point scales placed between opposing pairs of words (e.g. trustful/distrustful; 
family-like/uncaring).  In our study, respondents also used a five-point scale to rate 
their answer to the following question: “In general, the trust that I feel toward 
management may be described as.” The opposing word pairs were weak/strong; 
small/large; insignificant/significant; and low/high (see Appendix 1). 
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Expertise and Need for Control.  Perceptions of expertise and the need for control 
were both measured using multiple item scales.  Expertise questions asked subjects 
to compare the marketing expertise of the managers of the cooperative to the 
producer’s own marketing expertise.  Need for control questions focused on the 
importance to the subject of maintaining control of the marketing function.  
Cronbach’s alphas for both measures were above .85. 
 
Outsourcing.  The level of outsourcing was measured as the percentage of the 
producer’s total output that was marketed exclusively by the cooperative.  In other 
words, the percentage of the producer’s output to which all marketing control was 
relinquished to the managers of the cooperative.  Outsourcing is a measured, 




Path coefficients between cognitive processes and general trust; and affective 
responses and general trust were statistically significant and directionally correct in 
support of hypotheses H1 and H2, indicating that cognitive processes and affective 
responses are antecedents of general trust.  The path coefficient for the relationship 
between general trust and outsourcing was not significant, indicating no support for 
hypothesis H3.  Path coefficients and a comparison of alternative SEM models, using 
a chi-square test, and GFI and AGFI comparisons, indicated that the mediating role 
of perceptions of marketing expertise was significant with respect to general trust. 
Thus, hypothesis H4, concerning the effect of general trust on perceptions of 
expertise was supported.  Finally, the parameter estimate of the path from 
Expertise to Outsourcing was compared to the parameter estimate of the path from 
Control to Outsourcing using a t-test.  The difference in the absolute values of the 
critical ratios (t-value) between the path from Expertise to Outsourcing and the path 
from Control to Outsourcing was statistically different, with the estimate for 
Expertise being almost three times as large as that for Control.  This finding 




Our results provide empirical support to the general argument that trust matters in 
outsourcing decisions.  However, it appears that trust matters in a different way 
than one might expect.  Perhaps the most interesting finding of the paper is that the 
effect of trust is mediated by perceptions of expertise.  This mediation model 
augments our understanding of the role of trust in important managerial decisions 
such as outsourcing.  Rather than trust having a direct effect on a major decision 
like outsourcing, the effect of trust appears to be in its influence on perceptions that, 
in turn, lead to major decisions. 
 
Effects of perceptions of expertise are particularly interesting in the agricultural 
marketing cooperative context because marketing is certainly critical to the success 
of the producer.  Bettis, et al. (1992) strongly cautions against outsourcing critical 
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the firm is not likely to have a competitive advantage.  The data in the present study 
clearly show that many producers are willing to place the marketing function 
completely in the hands of the managers of the cooperative.  However, that decision 
is apparently based on an assessment of the expertise of the people doing the 
marketing.  Thus, the results obtained in the present study support the notion that 
managers (producers) are willing to outsource critical business functions, but only 
when general trust, mediated by perceptions of expertise, warrants such a decision. 
 
The explicit empirical consideration of affective responses and cognitive processes in 
arriving at general trust advances our understanding of the development of trust, 
especially given the integration within a model that also includes an important 
organizational outcome such as outsourcing.  By linking affective responses and 
cognitive processes to an organizational outcome through perceptions of expertise, 
we have provided an important empirical linkage between the trust development 
literature and the trust effect literature.   
 
These results also provide insight into the causality issue that is often raised 
concerning trust and outcomes.  SEM cannot ‘prove’ causality, just as regression 
analysis, ANOVA, and correlation analysis cannot ‘prove’ causality.  Although the 
survey data were cross-sectional in nature, subjects were asked to consider how they 
arrived at the perceptions they held.  Whereas simple ‘do you trust…’ questions tend 
to invite the direction of causality criticism, we believe the survey questions and the 
structural modeling of the data help to attenuate causality issues.  The survey 
questions were designed to gather information about the process of coming to a 
sense of general trust.  Our structural model was an attempt to accurately model 
that process.   
 
Research Implications.  Clearly there is a need for more research to be done on the 
phenomenon of outsourcing.  All along the food and fiber chain there appears to be 
opportunity and pressure to outsource business functions in the pursuit of 
competitive advantage.  This study has examined only the role of trust, perceptions 
of expertise, and the need for control in one type of outsourcing decision.  There is 
obvious need to examine other factors that influence the decision to outsource.  For 
example, several different relationship issues may provide further insight into the 
outsourcing decision, such as the length of the relationship between the relevant 
economic actors, demographic and geographic considerations, and various cost and 
quality issues.  Decisions of managers as to what to outsource and to whom it should 
be outsourced are also worthy of further research attention. 
  
Further research on trust is also warranted as global trade expands and trading 
pressures intensify.  Specifically, the development of trust among parties from 
different countries and regions of the world deserves more research attention.  One 
intriguing issue is the notion of universal trust.  How similar is the conception of 
trust across cultures?  Can trading partners from several different cultures 
simultaneously rely on a trusting relationship?  Another interesting issue is the role 
of trust in governing ongoing relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Barney & Hansen, M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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1994).  To what extent and under what circumstances can trust replace contractual 
relationships?  Of course, the trust that consumers have for food retailers and 
government regulatory bodies will continue to be an important research area.  
  
We encourage the use of SEM in examining these and other issues in agribusiness 
management.  SEM is a powerful, comprehensive modeling tool.  It is especially 
useful in modeling social processes involving abstract constructs that cannot be 
directly measured.  The ability to incorporate measured and latent variables as 
endogenous or exogenous variables makes SEM particularly useful in examining 
relationships among multiple parties.  SEM could prove to be an extremely valuable 
methodology as interest continues to grow in studying the complex relationships 
that characterize agribusiness. 
 
Managerial Implications.  One of the main implications of the present study for 
managers is that cognition and affect are both important in the development of 
trust.  Managers wanting to improve relationships with customers, suppliers, and 
employees would do well to offer both cognitive and affective experiences.  For 
example, an annual report can incorporate objective data for cognitive analysis as 
well as graphics and wording that will evoke an affective response.  Face-to-face 
meetings provide context in which affective responses can occur.  Cognition and 
affect are both important.  Managers will be better served by recognizing and 
responding to both. 
 
The results of this study may also prove helpful to managers by highlighting the 
need for other economic actors to perceive expertise in trading partners.  General 
trust alone is not enough to positively influence others to trade.  Furthermore, these 
results suggest that a party’s need for control may be overcome if that party 




This research is relevant in three ways.  First, it extends the body of knowledge on 
trust.  Second, it examines the outsourcing decision.  Finally, it introduces SEM in 
the agribusiness management literature, specifically in the marketing cooperative 
context.  These issues all have implications for researchers and managers interested 
in the apparently increasing pressure for firms to place important business 
functions in the hands of other entities.  Managers of these “other entities” who are 
in the business of performing business functions for other firms may benefit from 
understanding the decision processes of their potential customers.  Business models 
developed in commodity markets in response to ‘perfectly competitive’ markets may 
foreshadow high-tech business models of the future.  Cooperative strategies will 
likely continue to be one important response to increasingly competitive markets 
within and without the food and fiber chain. Also, although there may be a tendency 
to assume that trust will become less important as commerce becomes more 
electronic and less face-to-face, we argue that trust will remain an important 
managerial issue as long as cooperative strategies constitute an important business 
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1.  Marketing Program Participation 
  
The following questions ask about the extent to which you participate in Co-op A’s 
marketing program.  Please write your answers in the space provided. 
 
1. Approximately how many total acres do you farm?  _______ Acres 
2. Approximately how many acres do you devote to cotton 
in a typical year? 
 
_______ Acres 
3. Approximately how many bales of cotton do you 
produce in typical year? 
 
_______ Bales 
4. Approximately how many bales of cotton do you market 
with Co-op A in a typical year? 
 
_______ Bales 
5. Of the bales that you market with Co-op A in a typical 




6. Of the bales that you market with Co-op A in a typical 





2.  Co-op A Membership   
With these questions, we’re interested in knowing how you feel about your membership in 





1.  I feel a sense of belonging to Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  I feel that I am a member of the Co-op A 
team.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  I see myself as part of the Co-op A team.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  I am enthusiastic about Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  I am happy to be a part of Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  Co-op A is the best marketing organization in 
the region. 
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Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
 
3.  Co-op A Marketing Program   
Please answer the following questions concerning your views about Co-op A’s marketing 
program.  Answer these questions on the basis of how you feel about the marketing program 
in general, rather than your views of a specific marketing program. Please circle your 
answer using the scale at the right. 




1.  The managers of Co-op A are better at 
marketing than I am.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  I like having autonomy in how my cotton is 
marketed.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  I don’t mind giving the managers of Co-op A 
the authority to market my cotton.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  The managers of Co-op A can obtain more 
favorable prices than I can.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  The advantages of marketing my cotton with 
Co-op A are more important than the control 
that I have to surrender. 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  My desire to maintain some independence 
influences my level of participation with Co-
op A.   
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  The managers of Co-op A have superior 
marketing knowledge.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  I am comfortable turning over the marketing 
of my cotton to the managers of Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
9.  It is important to me that I maintain some 
freedom in marketing my cotton.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
10. I enjoy marketing the cotton that I produce.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
11. The managers of Co-op A have strong 
marketing advantages.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
12. In the future, I am likely to increase my level 
of participation with Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
13. In the future, I am likely to decrease my level 
of participation with Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
4.  Written Contracts  
These questions are intended to help us understand the extent to which you rely on written 
contracts to make decisions concerning your membership in Co-op A.  Please circle your  






1.  I sought legal advice concerning my decision 
to join Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  I am comfortable relying on the integrity of 
Co-op A management to guide their behavior.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  A written contract is needed to guide the 
behavior of Co-op A management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  If not for a written contract, Co-op A 
management might take unfair advantage of 
me. 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  I feel better about my relationship with Co-
op A because we have contracts in place.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  I feel comfortable relying only on verbal 
contracts to govern my relationship with Co-
op A. 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  Relying on written contracts is necessary for 
the proper operation of Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  A written contract is necessary to assure that 
Co-op A management acts in my best 
interest. 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
 
5.  Relationship with Other Members 
These questions are intended to help us understand the nature of your relationship with 
other members of Co-op A.  In particular, we’re interested in the trust that you have for 
other members of Co-op A and how you determine whether other members are trustworthy.  
In answering these questions, consider your relationship with other members of Co-op A in 
general, rather than your relationship with a particular member.  Please circle your answer 
using the scale at the right. 
 




1.  I was impartial when deciding the trust that 
should be placed in other members.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  My sense of intuition tells me that other 
members can be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  I have a hunch that I can trust other 
members. 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  I considered objective criteria when assessing 
the trustworthiness of other members.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  I assessed the trustworthiness of other 
members in an orderly fashion.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  The trustworthiness of other members can be 
determined by relying on my common sense.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  I feel that other members have a reputation 
for being trustworthy.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  My instincts tell me that I can trust other 
members.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
9.  I used a business-like approach to determine 
if I could trust other members.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
10. I relied on a rational process to gauge 
whether other members could be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
11. I intuitively know whether other members 
can be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
12. I was unbiased when judging the 
trustworthiness of other members.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
13. I have a ‘gut feeling’ that other members are 
trustworthy.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
  66
 




5.  Relationship with Other Members (continued) 
 
Please use the scales below to rate your answer to the following question: In general, the 
trust that I feel toward other members of Co-op A may be described as . . . 
 
14. Weak  1     2     3     4     5  Strong  
15. Small  1     2     3     4     5  Large  
16. Insignificant  1     2     3     4     5  Significant  




6.  Performance and Satisfaction 
 
Here, we’re interested in how your membership in Co-op A has affected the financial 
performance of your farm and how satisfied you are with your membership in Co-op A.  






1.  My Co-op A membership has resulted in 
increased profits.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  My Co-op A membership has resulted in 
increased sales revenue.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  Overall, I am satisfied with the results of my 
Co-op A membership.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  Overall, Co-op A has failed to meet my 
expectations.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  Overall, I am getting what I bargained for 
when I joined Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  I have viable alternatives but I have chosen 
to remain with Co-op A.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  I would like to leave Co-op A, but I feel I’m 
better off staying.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  I wish I could accomplish my objectives 
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Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
7.  Member Relations Activities 
Many co-ops engage in a variety of activities to provide information and feedback to their 
members.  In answering these questions, consider how you feel about these activities as they 






1.  How do you rate the importance of Co-op A’s 
magazine, Co-op A Review?   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  How do you rate the importance of the 
grower meetings held in your region?   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  How do you rate the importance of Co-op A’s 
office in your region?   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  How do you rate the importance of personal 
contact with a cotton specialist in your 
region? 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  How do you rate the importance of the year 
end financial statement information that Co-
op A provides to you? 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  How do you rate the importance of an annual 
membership meeting held in Greenwood, 
MS? 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  How do you rate the importance of having a 
representative from your region on the Co-op 
A Board of Directors? 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  How do you rate the importance of the 
involvement in your local community by your 
region’s cotton specialists? 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
Please use the scales below to rate your answer to the following question: In 
general, the overall success of Co-op A’s efforts in the area of member relations 
may be described as . . . 
 
 
9.  Weak  1   2   3   4   5     Strong 
10. Small    1   2   3   4   5     Large  
11. Insignificant    1   2   3   4   5     Significant  
12.  Low  1   2   3   4   5     High 
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Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
 
8.  Relationship with Management 
 
The purpose of these questions is to help us understand the nature of your relationship with 
the management of Co-op A.  In particular, we’re interested in the trust that you have for 
Co-op A management and how you determine whether management is trustworthy.  In 
answering these questions, consider how you feel about the management team of Co-op A in 
general, and not any specific member(s) of management.  Please circle your answer using 






1.  I was impartial when deciding the trust that 
should be placed in management.     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2.  My sense of intuition tells me that 
management can be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3.  I have a hunch that I can trust management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4.  I considered objective criteria when assessing 
the trustworthiness of management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5.  I assessed the trustworthiness of 
management in an orderly fashion.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6.  The trustworthiness of management can be 
determined by relying on my common sense.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7.  I feel that management has a reputation for 
being trustworthy.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8.  My instincts tell me that I can trust 
management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
9.  I used a business-like approach to determine 
if I could trust management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
10. I relied on a rational process to gauge 
whether management could be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
11. I intuitively know whether management can 
be trusted.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
12. I was unbiased when judging the 
trustworthiness of management.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
13. I have a ‘gut feeling’ that management is 
trustworthy.   1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 M. Hansen and J.L. Morrow / The International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
  69
Appendix 1 (cont.) 
Survey Instrument 
 
8.  Relationship with Management (continued) 
 
Use the scales below to rate your answer to the following question: In general, the 
trust that I feel toward Co-op A management may be described as . . . 
 
14. Weak  1     2     3     4     5  Strong  
15. Small  1     2     3     4     5  Large  
16. Insignificant  1     2     3     4     5  Significant  
17. Low  1     2     3     4     5  High  
 
9.  Tell us some things about yourself. 
 
1.  How long (in years) have you been growing cotton?   ________  Years 
2.  How long (in years) have you been a continuous 
member of Co-op A?    ________  Years 
3.  Is/was your father a member of Co-op A?  Yes or No (circle one) 
4.  Are other members of your family besides your father 
(such as brothers, uncles or in-laws) also members of 
Co-op A?   
Yes or No (circle one) 
5.  Are growers who you consider to be your neighbors 
members of Co-op A?  Yes or No (circle one) 
6.  Are growers who you consider to be among your 
friends members of Co-op A?  Yes or No (circle one) 
7.  Have you ever discontinued your membership in Co-
op A?    Yes or No (circle one) 
8.  What is your zip code?     
 






Thank you for your participation. 
Please return the completed survey in the envelope provided. 